TY  - JOUR
Y1  - 2001///
SN  - 0378-4371
N2  - In the stable marriage problem two sets of agents must be paired according to mutual preferences, which may happen to conflict. We present two generalizations of its sex-oriented version, aiming to take into account correlations between the preferences of agents and costly information. Their effects are investigated both numerically and analytically.
JF  - Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
SP  - 268
A1  - Caldarelli, Guido
A1  - Capocci, Andrea
A1  - Laureti, Paolo
PB  - Elsevier
EP  - 272
VL  - 299
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0378-4371(01)00305-3
IS  - 1-2
KW  - PACS: 05.20.?y; 01.75.+m; 02.50.Le
AV  - none
ID  - eprints1153
TI  - Sex-oriented stable matchings of the marriage problem with correlated and incomplete information
ER  -