%R 10.1016/S0378-4371(01)00305-3
%T Sex-oriented stable matchings of the marriage problem with correlated and incomplete information
%J Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
%P 268-272
%L eprints1153
%K PACS: 05.20.?y; 01.75.+m; 02.50.Le
%X In the stable marriage problem two sets of agents must be paired according to mutual preferences, which may happen to conflict. We present two generalizations of its sex-oriented version, aiming to take into account correlations between the preferences of agents and costly information. Their effects are investigated both numerically and analytically.
%I Elsevier
%A Guido Caldarelli
%A Andrea Capocci
%A Paolo Laureti
%D 2001
%V 299
%N 1-2