eprintid: 128
rev_number: 7
eprint_status: archive
userid: 29
dir: disk0/00/00/01/28
datestamp: 2011-03-01 09:27:17
lastmod: 2011-07-11 14:33:43
status_changed: 2011-03-01 09:27:17
type: article
metadata_visibility: show
item_issues_count: 0
creators_name: Boreale, Michele
creators_name: Buscemi, Maria Grazia
creators_id: 
creators_id: m.buscemi@imtlucca.it
title: A Method for Symbolic Analysis of Security Protocols
ispublished: pub
subjects: QA75
divisions: CSA
full_text_status: none
keywords: Security protocol analysis; Symbolic techniques; Process calculi
note: Copyright © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 
abstract: In security protocols, message exchange between the intruder and honest participants induces a form of state explosion which makes protocol models infinite. We propose a general method for automatic analysis of security protocols based on the notion of frame, essentially a rewrite system plus a set of distinguished terms called messages. Frames are intended to model generic crypto-systems. Based on frames, we introduce a process language akin to Abadi and Fournet's applied pi. For this language, we define a symbolic operational semantics that relies on unification and provides finite and effective protocol models. Next, we give a method to carry out trace analysis directly on the symbolic model. We spell out a regularity condition on the underlying frame, which guarantees completeness of our method for the considered class of properties, including secrecy and various forms of authentication. We show how to instantiate our method to some of the most common crypto-systems, including shared- and public-key encryption, hashing and Diffie–Hellman key exchange.
date: 2005
date_type: published
publication: Theoretical Computer Science
volume: 338
number: 1-3
publisher: Elsevier
pagerange: 393-425
id_number: doi: 10.1016/j.tcs.2005.03.044
refereed: TRUE
issn: 0304-3975
official_url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2005.03.044
funders: This work has been partially supported by EU within the IST FET—Global Computing initiative, Projects MIKADO and PROFUNDIS.
citation:   Boreale, Michele and Buscemi, Maria Grazia  A Method for Symbolic Analysis of Security Protocols.  Theoretical Computer Science, 338 (1-3).  pp. 393-425.  ISSN 0304-3975      (2005)