@incollection{eprints130,
          author = {Michele Boreale and Maria Grazia Buscemi},
       publisher = {Springer},
            note = {The final publication is available at www.springerlink.com},
          editor = {Branislav Rovan and Peter Vojt{\'a}{\v s}},
       booktitle = {Proceedings of the 28th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS ?03)},
           pages = {269--278},
          volume = {2747},
            year = {2003},
          series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
           title = {Symbolic Analysis of Crypto-Protocols Based on Modular Exponentiation},
             url = {http://eprints.imtlucca.it/130/},
        abstract = {Automatic methods developed so far for analysis of security protocols only model a limited set of cryptographic primitives (often, only encryption and concatenation) and from low-level features of cryptographic algorithms. This paper is an attempt towards closing this gap. We propose a symbolic technique and a decision method for analysis of protocols based on modular exponentiation, such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange. We introduce a protocol description language along with its semantics. Then, we propose a notion of symbolic execution and, based on it, a verification method. We prove that the method is sound and complete with respect to the language semantics.}
}