TY  - CHAP
M1  - 2747
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45138-9_21
A1  - Boreale, Michele
A1  - Buscemi, Maria Grazia
Y1  - 2003///
AV  - none
N1  - The final publication is available at www.springerlink.com
SP  - 269
TI  - Symbolic Analysis of Crypto-Protocols Based on Modular Exponentiation
T3  - Lecture Notes in Computer Science
PB  - Springer
T2  - Proceedings of the 28th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS ?03)
SN  - 3-540-40671-9
ED  - Rovan, Branislav
ED  - Vojtá?, Peter
N2  - Automatic methods developed so far for analysis of security protocols only model a limited set of cryptographic primitives (often, only encryption and concatenation) and from low-level features of cryptographic algorithms. This paper is an attempt towards closing this gap. We propose a symbolic technique and a decision method for analysis of protocols based on modular exponentiation, such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange. We introduce a protocol description language along with its semantics. Then, we propose a notion of symbolic execution and, based on it, a verification method. We prove that the method is sound and complete with respect to the language semantics.
ID  - eprints130
EP  - 278
ER  -