%V 2747
%I Springer
%O The final publication is available at www.springerlink.com
%P 269-278
%T Symbolic Analysis of Crypto-Protocols Based on Modular Exponentiation
%R 10.1007/978-3-540-45138-9_21
%B Proceedings of the 28th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS ?03)
%D 2003
%L eprints130
%E Branislav Rovan
%E Peter Vojt??
%X Automatic methods developed so far for analysis of security protocols only model a limited set of cryptographic primitives (often, only encryption and concatenation) and from low-level features of cryptographic algorithms. This paper is an attempt towards closing this gap. We propose a symbolic technique and a decision method for analysis of protocols based on modular exponentiation, such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange. We introduce a protocol description language along with its semantics. Then, we propose a notion of symbolic execution and, based on it, a verification method. We prove that the method is sound and complete with respect to the language semantics.
%A Michele Boreale
%A Maria Grazia Buscemi
%S Lecture Notes in Computer Science