eprintid: 132
rev_number: 8
eprint_status: archive
userid: 29
dir: disk0/00/00/01/32
datestamp: 2011-03-01 10:35:11
lastmod: 2011-07-11 14:33:43
status_changed: 2011-03-01 10:35:11
type: book_section
metadata_visibility: show
item_issues_count: 0
creators_name: Boreale, Michele
creators_name: Buscemi, Maria Grazia
creators_id: 
creators_id: m.buscemi@imtlucca.it
title: A Framework for the Analysis of Security Protocols
ispublished: pub
subjects: QA75
divisions: CSA
full_text_status: none
note: The final publication is available at www.springerlink.com
abstract: Properties of security protocols such as authentication and secrecy are often verified by explictly generating an operational model of the protocol and then seeking for insecure states. However, message exchange between the intruder and the honest participants induces a form of state explosion that makes the model infinite in principle. Building on previous work on symbolic semantics, we propose a general framework for automatic analysis of security protocols that make use of a variety of crypto-functions. We start from a base language akin to the spi-calculus, equipped with a set of generic cryptographic primitives. We propose a symbolic operational semantics that relies on unification and provides finite and effective protocol models. Next, we give a method to carry out trace analysis directly on the symbolic model. Under certain conditions on the given cryptographic primitives, our method is proven complete for the considered class of properties.
date: 2002
date_type: published
series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
volume: 2421
publisher: Springer
pagerange: 483-498
id_number: 10.1007/3-540-45694-5_32
refereed: TRUE
isbn: 3-540-44043-7
book_title: Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR ’02)
editors_name: Brim, Luboš
editors_name: Jancar, Petr
editors_name: Kretínský,, Mojmír
editors_name: Kucera, Antonín
official_url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45694-5_32
funders: Research supported in part by FET Global project PROFUNDIS and by MIUR project COMETA.
citation:   Boreale, Michele and Buscemi, Maria Grazia  A Framework for the Analysis of Security Protocols.   In:  Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR ’02).   Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2421 .  Springer, pp. 483-498.  ISBN 3-540-44043-7      (2002)