@incollection{eprints133,
       booktitle = {Proceedings of ACM Symposium in Applied Computing (SAC ?02)},
          author = {Michele Boreale and Maria Grazia Buscemi},
            note = {Primary Classification:
C. Computer Systems Organization
C.2 COMPUTER-COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
C.2.2 Network Protocols
Subjects: Protocol verification

Additional Classification:
D. Software
D.4 OPERATING SYSTEMS
D.4.6 Security and Protection},
       publisher = {ACM Press},
            year = {2002},
           title = {Experimenting with STA, a Tool for Automatic Analysis of Security Protocols},
           pages = {281--285},
         address = {Madrid},
             url = {http://eprints.imtlucca.it/133/},
        abstract = {We present STA (Symbolic Trace Analyzer). a tool for the analysis
of security protocols. STA relies on symbolic techniques that avoid
explicit construction of the whole, possibly infinite, state-space of
protocols. This results in accurate protocol modeling, increased
efficiency and mere direct formalization, when compared to finitestate
techniques. We illustrate the use of STA by analyzing the
well-known asymmetric Needham Schroeder protocol. We discuss
the results of this analysis, and contrast them with previous work
based on finite-state model checking.}
}