TY  - JOUR
SN  - 1593-8662
AV  - none
N2  - The aim of this paper is to analyze from an economic perspective the effects of the judicial careers arrangement on the trials? outcome. The institutional organization of judicial careers follows two distinct ideal systems. One is characterized by the fact that public prosecutor and judge belong to the same professional body, as magistrates, while the other one is characterized by the separation of the judiciary from prosecutors. We model this feature of the judicial system as a continuum variable and explain  why this choice can be appropriate. We obtain that a more unified system of judicial careers leads to fewer distortions in the process preceding the trial, while it introduces more distortions during the trial. We find the optimal degree of separation of judicial careers and provide some comparative statics results.
TI  - An Economic Analysis of Judicial Careers
SP  - 481
EP  - 507
ID  - eprints1430
PB  - Il Mulino
VL  - 3
Y1  - 2012/12//
JF  - Rivista italiana degli economisti
UR  - http://www.mulino.it/rivisteweb/scheda_articolo.php?id_articolo=38534
A1  - Polidori, Paolo
A1  - Teobaldelli, Désirée
A1  - Ticchi, Davide
KW  - JEL classification: K00
KW  -  K40; Keywords: Legal System
KW  -  Judicial Careers.
ER  -