eprintid: 1430
rev_number: 6
eprint_status: archive
userid: 6
dir: disk0/00/00/14/30
datestamp: 2012-11-27 08:30:44
lastmod: 2012-11-27 08:30:44
status_changed: 2012-11-27 08:30:44
type: article
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Polidori, Paolo
creators_name: Teobaldelli, Désirée
creators_name: Ticchi, Davide
creators_id: 
creators_id: 
creators_id: davide.ticchi@imtlucca.it
title: An Economic Analysis of Judicial Careers
ispublished: pub
subjects: HB
subjects: K1
divisions: EIC
full_text_status: none
keywords: JEL classification: K00, K40; Keywords: Legal System, Judicial Careers.
abstract: The aim of this paper is to analyze from an economic perspective the effects of the judicial careers arrangement on the trials’ outcome. The institutional organization of judicial careers follows two distinct ideal systems. One is characterized by the fact that public prosecutor and judge belong to the same professional body, as magistrates, while the other one is characterized by the separation of the judiciary from prosecutors. We model this feature of the judicial system as a continuum variable and explain  why this choice can be appropriate. We obtain that a more unified system of judicial careers leads to fewer distortions in the process preceding the trial, while it introduces more distortions during the trial. We find the optimal degree of separation of judicial careers and provide some comparative statics results.
date: 2012-12
date_type: published
publication: Rivista italiana degli economisti
volume: 3
publisher: Il Mulino
pagerange: 481-507
refereed: TRUE
issn: 1593-8662
official_url: http://www.mulino.it/rivisteweb/scheda_articolo.php?id_articolo=38534
citation:   Polidori, Paolo and Teobaldelli, Désirée and Ticchi, Davide  An Economic Analysis of Judicial Careers.  Rivista italiana degli economisti, 3.  pp. 481-507.  ISSN 1593-8662      (2012)