relation: http://eprints.imtlucca.it/17/
title: The Political Economy of Fiscal Prudence in Historical Perspective
creator: Dincecco, Mark
subject: HC Economic History and Conditions
subject: HJ Public Finance
subject: JN Political institutions (Europe)
description: This paper uses a new panel dataset to perform a statistical analysis of political regimes and financial rectitude over the long run. Old Regime polities in Europe typically suffered from fiscal fragmentation and absolutist rule. By the start of World War I, however, many such countries had centralized institutions and limited government. Panel regressions indicate that political transformations toward centralized and limited regimes led to significant improvements in fiscal prudence. Dynamic estimations and structural breaks tests reinforce these findings. The results suggest that good financial housekeeping is one mechanism through which political reforms reduce sovereign credit risk.
publisher: Wiley Blackwell
date: 2010-03-01
type: Article
type: PeerReviewed
identifier:   Dincecco, Mark  The Political Economy of Fiscal Prudence in Historical Perspective.  Economics & Politics, 22 (1).  pp. 1-36.  ISSN 0954-1985      (2010)  
relation: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2009.00349.x
relation: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2009.00349.x