eprintid: 17
rev_number: 26
eprint_status: archive
userid: 18
importid: 2
dir: disk0/00/00/00/17
datestamp: 2011-02-07 11:25:03
lastmod: 2011-09-29 13:46:58
status_changed: 2011-09-29 13:46:58
type: article
metadata_visibility: show
contact_email: m.dincecco@imtlucca.it
item_issues_count: 0
creators_name: Dincecco, Mark
creators_id: m.dincecco@imtlucca.it
title: The Political Economy of Fiscal Prudence in Historical Perspective
ispublished: pub
subjects: HC
subjects: HJ
subjects: JN
divisions: EIC
full_text_status: none
abstract: This paper uses a new panel dataset to perform a statistical analysis of political regimes and financial rectitude over the long run. Old Regime polities in Europe typically suffered from fiscal fragmentation and absolutist rule. By the start of World War I, however, many such countries had centralized institutions and limited government. Panel regressions indicate that political transformations toward centralized and limited regimes led to significant improvements in fiscal prudence. Dynamic estimations and structural breaks tests reinforce these findings. The results suggest that good financial housekeeping is one mechanism through which political reforms reduce sovereign credit risk.
date: 2010-03-01
date_type: published
publication: Economics & Politics
volume: 22
number: 1
publisher: Wiley Blackwell
pagerange: 1-36
id_number: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.2009.00349.x
refereed: TRUE
issn: 0954-1985
official_url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2009.00349.x
citation:   Dincecco, Mark  The Political Economy of Fiscal Prudence in Historical Perspective.  Economics & Politics, 22 (1).  pp. 1-36.  ISSN 0954-1985      (2010)