?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Adc&rft.relation=http%3A%2F%2Feprints.imtlucca.it%2F1855%2F&rft.title=Optimal+Incentives+in+a+Principal-Agent+Model+with+Endogenous+Technology&rft.creator=Marini%2C+Marco+A.&rft.creator=Polidori%2C+Paolo&rft.creator=Ticchi%2C+Davide&rft.creator=Teobaldelli%2C+D%C3%A9sir%C3%A9e&rft.subject=HB+Economic+Theory&rft.subject=HD61+Risk+Management&rft.description=One+of+the+standard+predictions+of+the+agency+theory+is+that+more+incentives+can+be+given+to+agents+with+lower+risk+aversion.+In+this+paper+we+show+that+this+relationship+may+be+absent+or+reversed+when+the+technology+is+endogenous+and+projects+with+a+higher+e%C2%A2+ciency+are+also+riskier.+Using+a+modi+ed+version+of+the+Holmstrom+and+Milgrom's+(1987)+framework%2C+we+obtain+that+lower+agent's+risk+aversion+unambiguously+leads+to+higher+incentives+when+the+technology+function+linking+efficiency+and+riskiness+is+elastic%2C+while+the+risk+aversion-incentive+relation-+ship+can+be+positive+when+this+function+is+rigid.&rft.publisher=Universit%C3%A0+degli+studi+di+Urbino.+Facolt%C3%A0+di+economia&rft.date=2013&rft.type=Working+Paper&rft.type=NonPeerReviewed&rft.identifier=++Marini%2C+Marco+A.+and+Polidori%2C+Paolo+and+Ticchi%2C+Davide+and+Teobaldelli%2C+D%C3%A9sir%C3%A9e++Optimal+Incentives+in+a+Principal-Agent+Model+with+Endogenous+Technology.++Working+Paper++%2304%2F2013++++Universit%C3%A0+degli+studi+di+Urbino.+Facolt%C3%A0+di+economia++++ISSN+1974-4110.++++++&rft.relation=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.econ.uniurb.it%2FRePEc%2Furb%2Fwpaper%2FWP_13_04.pdf