TY  - JOUR
PB  - Cambridge University Press
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S136149160900238X
EP  - 63
SP  - 31
AV  - public
SN  - 1361-4916
JF  - European Review of Economic History
ID  - eprints19
N2  - This article uses a new panel data set to perform a statistical analysis of political regimes and sovereign credit risk in Europe from 1750 to 1913. Old Regime polities typically suffered from fiscal fragmentation and absolutist rule. By the start of World War I, however, many such countries had centralized institutions and limited government. Panel regressions indicate that centralized and?or limited regimes were associated with significant improvements in credit risk relative to fragmented and absolutist ones. Structural break tests also reveal close relationships between major turning points in yield series and political transformations. 
TI  - Political Regimes and Sovereign Credit Risk in Europe, 1750-1913
IS  - 1
VL  - 13
A1  - Dincecco, Mark
Y1  - 2009/03/01/
ER  -