eprintid: 19
rev_number: 37
eprint_status: archive
userid: 18
importid: 2
dir: disk0/00/00/00/19
datestamp: 2011-02-07 11:48:24
lastmod: 2012-03-19 08:16:32
status_changed: 2011-09-29 13:47:13
type: article
metadata_visibility: show
contact_email: m.dincecco@imtlucca.it
item_issues_count: 0
creators_name: Dincecco, Mark
creators_id: m.dincecco@imtlucca.it
title: Political Regimes and Sovereign Credit Risk in Europe, 1750-1913
ispublished: pub
subjects: HC
subjects: HJ
subjects: JN
divisions: EIC
full_text_status: public
abstract: This article uses a new panel data set to perform a statistical analysis of political regimes and sovereign credit risk in Europe from 1750 to 1913. Old Regime polities typically suffered from fiscal fragmentation and absolutist rule. By the start of World War I, however, many such countries had centralized institutions and limited government. Panel regressions indicate that centralized and?or limited regimes were associated with significant improvements in credit risk relative to fragmented and absolutist ones. Structural break tests also reveal close relationships between major turning points in yield series and political transformations. 
date: 2009-03-01
date_type: published
publication: European Review of Economic History
volume: 13
number: 1
publisher: Cambridge University Press
pagerange: 31-63
id_number: 10.1017/S136149160900238X
refereed: TRUE
issn: 1361-4916
official_url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S136149160900238X
citation:   Dincecco, Mark  Political Regimes and Sovereign Credit Risk in Europe, 1750-1913.  European Review of Economic History, 13 (1).  pp. 31-63.  ISSN 1361-4916      (2009)  
document_url: http://eprints.imtlucca.it/19/1/dincecco2009a.pdf