relation: http://eprints.imtlucca.it/20/
title: Fiscal Centralization, Limited Government, and Public Revenues in Europe, 1650-1913
creator: Dincecco, Mark
subject: HC Economic History and Conditions
subject: HJ Public Finance
subject: JN Political institutions (Europe)
description: Old Regime polities typically suffered from fiscal fragmentation and absolutist rule. By the start of World War I, however, many such countries had centralized institutions and limited government. This article uses a new panel data set to perform a statistical analysis of political regimes and public revenues in Europe from 1650 to 1913. Panel regressions indicate that centralized and limited regimes were associated with significantly higher revenues than fragmented and absolutist ones. Structural break tests also suggest close relationships between major turning points in revenue series and political transformations. 
publisher: Cambridge University Press
date: 2009-02-01
type: Article
type: PeerReviewed
format: application/pdf
language: en
identifier: http://eprints.imtlucca.it/20/1/dincecco2009b.pdf
identifier:   Dincecco, Mark  Fiscal Centralization, Limited Government, and Public Revenues in Europe, 1650-1913.  Journal of Economic History, 69 (1).  pp. 48-103.  ISSN 0022-0507      (2009)  
relation: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022050709000345
relation: doi: 10.1017/S0022050709000345