eprintid: 20
rev_number: 35
eprint_status: archive
userid: 18
importid: 2
dir: disk0/00/00/00/20
datestamp: 2011-02-07 11:57:23
lastmod: 2011-09-29 13:47:20
status_changed: 2011-09-29 13:47:20
type: article
metadata_visibility: show
item_issues_count: 0
creators_name: Dincecco, Mark
creators_id: m.dincecco@imtlucca.it
title: Fiscal Centralization, Limited Government, and Public Revenues in Europe, 1650-1913
ispublished: pub
subjects: HC
subjects: HJ
subjects: JN
divisions: EIC
full_text_status: public
note: Revenue data available at the Global Price and Income History Group Website: http://gpih.ucdavis.edu/Evidence.htm.
abstract: Old Regime polities typically suffered from fiscal fragmentation and absolutist rule. By the start of World War I, however, many such countries had centralized institutions and limited government. This article uses a new panel data set to perform a statistical analysis of political regimes and public revenues in Europe from 1650 to 1913. Panel regressions indicate that centralized and limited regimes were associated with significantly higher revenues than fragmented and absolutist ones. Structural break tests also suggest close relationships between major turning points in revenue series and political transformations. 
date: 2009-02-01
date_type: published
publication: Journal of Economic History
volume: 69
number: 1
publisher: Cambridge University Press
pagerange: 48-103
id_number: doi: 10.1017/S0022050709000345
refereed: TRUE
issn: 0022-0507
official_url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022050709000345
citation:   Dincecco, Mark  Fiscal Centralization, Limited Government, and Public Revenues in Europe, 1650-1913.  Journal of Economic History, 69 (1).  pp. 48-103.  ISSN 0022-0507      (2009)  
document_url: http://eprints.imtlucca.it/20/1/dincecco2009b.pdf