eprintid: 2216
rev_number: 8
eprint_status: archive
userid: 6
dir: disk0/00/00/22/16
datestamp: 2014-06-30 08:32:08
lastmod: 2014-06-30 08:32:34
status_changed: 2014-06-30 08:32:08
type: monograph
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Koeniger, Winfried
creators_name: Vindigni, Andrea
creators_id: 
creators_id: andrea.vindigni@imtlucca.it
title: Employment protection and product market regulation
ispublished: pub
subjects: HB
divisions: EIC
full_text_status: none
monograph_type: discussion_paper
keywords: Keywords: collective dismissal cost, political economy   -   JEL Classification: J63, J65, L16
abstract: Product market regulation and employment protection are highly correlated across OECD countries. Using an augmented model of monopolistic competition we show why in countries with more regulated product markets, incumbent workers prefer to protect jobs relatively more. Product market regulation increases the scope for employment protection because firms can bear the cost of employment protection more easily and still break even. Moreover, product market regulation decreases employment so that the workers' outside option becomes relatively worse. This increases the incentive to protect the job.
date: 2003-10
date_type: published
number: 880
publisher: IZA Discussion paper
pages: 39
institution: IMT Institute for Advanced Studies Lucca
official_url: http://www.iza.org/en/webcontent/publications/papers/viewAbstract?dp_id=880
citation:   Koeniger, Winfried and Vindigni, Andrea  Employment protection and product market regulation.  Discussion Paper  #880/2003    IZA Discussion paper