@article{eprints2577,
           pages = {209--267},
          number = {1},
          volume = {33},
           month = {January},
            year = {2015},
           title = {Uncertainty and the politics of employment protection},
          author = {Andrea Vindigni and Simone Scotti and Cristina Tealdi},
       publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
         journal = {Journal of Labor Economics},
        keywords = {Labor-market flexibility; Equilibrium unemployment; Severance payments; Firing costs; Job security; Turnover; Wage; Economy; Institutions; Persistence},
        abstract = {This paper investigates social preferences over employment protection regulation in a general equilibrium model of dynamic labor demand and sheds some light on the comparative dynamics of Eurosclerosis. When firing costs are low, a transition to a rigid labor market is favored by all the employed workers with idiosyncratic productivity below some threshold; when their status quo level is high, preserving a rigid labor market is favored only by the employed with intermediate productivity. A more volatile environment and a lower rate of productivity growth increase the political support for labor market rigidity only in high-rents economies.},
             url = {http://eprints.imtlucca.it/2577/}
}