TY  - JOUR
KW  - Labor-market flexibility; Equilibrium unemployment; Severance payments; Firing costs; Job security; Turnover; Wage; Economy; Institutions; Persistence
Y1  - 2015/01//
A1  - Vindigni, Andrea
A1  - Scotti, Simone
A1  - Tealdi, Cristina
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/678306
VL  - 33
SP  - 209
TI  - Uncertainty and the politics of employment protection
AV  - none
IS  - 1
JF  - Journal of Labor Economics
PB  - University of Chicago Press
EP  - 267
ID  - eprints2577
N2  - This paper investigates social preferences over employment protection regulation in a general equilibrium model of dynamic labor demand and sheds some light on the comparative dynamics of Eurosclerosis. When firing costs are low, a transition to a rigid labor market is favored by all the employed workers with idiosyncratic productivity below some threshold; when their status quo level is high, preserving a rigid labor market is favored only by the employed with intermediate productivity. A more volatile environment and a lower rate of productivity growth increase the political support for labor market rigidity only in high-rents economies.
SN  - 0734-306X
ER  -