eprintid: 2577
rev_number: 6
eprint_status: archive
userid: 6
dir: disk0/00/00/25/77
datestamp: 2015-02-09 09:55:09
lastmod: 2015-02-09 09:55:09
status_changed: 2015-02-09 09:55:09
type: article
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Vindigni, Andrea
creators_name: Scotti, Simone
creators_name: Tealdi, Cristina
creators_id: andrea.vindigni@imtlucca.it
creators_id: 
creators_id: cristina.tealdi@imtlucca.it
title: Uncertainty and the politics of employment protection
ispublished: pub
subjects: HB
subjects: HD
divisions: EIC
full_text_status: none
keywords: Labor-market flexibility; Equilibrium unemployment; Severance payments; Firing costs; Job security; Turnover; Wage; Economy; Institutions; Persistence
abstract: This paper investigates social preferences over employment protection regulation in a general equilibrium model of dynamic labor demand and sheds some light on the comparative dynamics of Eurosclerosis. When firing costs are low, a transition to a rigid labor market is favored by all the employed workers with idiosyncratic productivity below some threshold; when their status quo level is high, preserving a rigid labor market is favored only by the employed with intermediate productivity. A more volatile environment and a lower rate of productivity growth increase the political support for labor market rigidity only in high-rents economies.
date: 2015-01
date_type: published
publication: Journal of Labor Economics
volume: 33
number: 1
publisher: University of Chicago Press
pagerange: 209-267
id_number: doi:10.1086/678306
refereed: TRUE
issn: 0734-306X
official_url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/678306
citation:   Vindigni, Andrea and Scotti, Simone and Tealdi, Cristina  Uncertainty and the politics of employment protection.  Journal of Labor Economics, 33 (1).  pp. 209-267.  ISSN 0734-306X      (2015)