<> "The repository administrator has not yet configured an RDF license."^^ . <> . . . "Generic Competition and Price Regulation in Pharmaceuticals: Evidence from the European Union"^^ . "The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent of generic competition in European\r\ncountries, given an understanding of these countries' different pharmaceutical price regulations and\r\nhealth care structures. In particular, this study investigates generic competition among the five largest\r\nEuropean pharmaceutical markets; the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy and Spain, with\r\ncomprehensive IMS data set for 10 years (1994-2003), in order to estimate the effect of generic entry\r\non drug prices at the product level. Both within and across these countries, different interventions are\r\nbeing applied to in-patent and off-patent markets during 10 years of the study period. For example, in\r\nGermany, markets for on-patent drugs are largely unregulated and prices are set relatively freely;\r\nhowever, once generics enter the market, the German government uses reference pricing to set\r\nreimbursement rates. In the UK, originator medicine prices are free from direct regulatory\r\nintervention, but are subject to a rate of return regulation. Additionally, once generics enter the\r\nmarket, the UK's government uses price caps. France, Italy, and Spain, on the other hand, use direct\r\nprice controls for originator drugs and reference pricing system for generic drugs. Accordingly, this\r\nanalysis finds that generic entry has a negative effect on prices in countries with free pricing originator\r\nmarket, whereas in European Union (EU) countries with strict price and reimbursement regulation,\r\ngeneric competition is ineffective and/or counterproductive. Low regulated prices for originator\r\nproducts do not encourage generic entry following patent expiration. This finding is consistent with\r\nless generic firms and less competitive late entrants in regulated environments. Thus, strict price\r\nregulation undermines price competition in the off-patent sector, and cost savings from post-patent\r\ncompetition are not realized in countries with strict pricing and reimbursement policies."^^ . "2015-05" . . . "Elsevier"^^ . . . "International Journal of Industrial Organization"^^ . . . "01677187" . . . . . . "Berna"^^ . "Tuncay"^^ . "Berna Tuncay"^^ . . . . . . "Generic Competition and Price Regulation in Pharmaceuticals: Evidence from the European Union (PDF)"^^ . . . . . . "Generic Competition-1.pdf"^^ . . . "Generic Competition and Price Regulation in Pharmaceuticals: Evidence from the European Union (Other)"^^ . . . . . . "lightbox.jpg"^^ . . . "Generic Competition and Price Regulation in Pharmaceuticals: Evidence from the European Union (Other)"^^ . . . . . . "preview.jpg"^^ . . . "Generic Competition and Price Regulation in Pharmaceuticals: Evidence from the European Union (Other)"^^ . . . . . . "medium.jpg"^^ . . . "Generic Competition and Price Regulation in Pharmaceuticals: Evidence from the European Union (Other)"^^ . . . . . . "small.jpg"^^ . . "HTML Summary of #2671 \n\nGeneric Competition and Price Regulation in Pharmaceuticals: Evidence from the European Union\n\n" . "text/html" . . . "HB Economic Theory"@en . .