eprintid: 2852
rev_number: 8
eprint_status: archive
userid: 69
dir: disk0/00/00/28/52
datestamp: 2015-11-06 13:16:21
lastmod: 2015-11-06 13:16:21
status_changed: 2015-11-06 13:16:21
type: article
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Cimini, Giulio
creators_name: Castellano, Claudio
creators_name: Sánchez, Angel
creators_id: giulio.cimini@imtlucca.it
creators_id: 
creators_id: 
title: Dynamics to Equilibrium in Network Games: Individual Behavior and Global Response
ispublished: pub
subjects: HM
subjects: QA
divisions: EIC
full_text_status: public
keywords: Games, Graphs, Imitation, Convergent evolution, Social networks
abstract: Various social contexts can be depicted as games of strategic interactions on networks, where an individual’s welfare depends on both her and her partners’ actions. Whereas much attention has been devoted to Bayes-Nash equilibria in such games, here we look at strategic interactions from an evolutionary perspective. To this end, we present the results of a numerical simulations program for these games, which allows us to find out whether Nash equilibria are accessible by adaptation of player strategies, and in general to identify the attractors of the evolution. Simulations allow us to go beyond a global characterization of the cooperativeness at equilibrium and probe into individual behavior. We find that when players imitate each other, evolution does not reach Nash equilibria and, worse, leads to very unfavorable states in terms of welfare. On the contrary, when players update their behavior rationally, they self-organize into a rich variety of Nash equilibria, where individual behavior and payoffs are shaped by the nature of the game, the social network’s structure and the players’ position within the network. Our results allow to assess the validity of mean-field approaches we use to describe the dynamics of these games. Interestingly, our dynamically-found equilibria generally do not coincide with (but show qualitatively the same features of) those resulting from theoretical predictions in the context of one-shot games under incomplete information.
date: 2015
date_type: published
publication: PloS One
volume: 10
number: 3
publisher: Public Library of Science
pagerange: e0120343
id_number: 10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0120343
refereed: TRUE
issn: 1932-6203
official_url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0120343
citation:   Cimini, Giulio and Castellano, Claudio and Sánchez, Angel  Dynamics to Equilibrium in Network Games: Individual Behavior and Global Response.  PloS One, 10 (3).  e0120343.  ISSN 1932-6203      (2015)  
document_url: http://eprints.imtlucca.it/2852/1/journal.pone.0120343.pdf