@inproceedings{eprints3130,
           title = {A Two-Player Differential Game Model for the Management of Transboundary Pollution and
Environmental Absorption},
          author = {Giorgio Gnecco and F. El Ouardighi and K. Kogan and Marcello Sanguineti},
       booktitle = {Book of abstracts of the 45th Conference of Italian Operational Research Society (AIRO)},
           pages = {306--307},
            year = {2015},
             url = {http://eprints.imtlucca.it/3130/},
        abstract = {It is likely that the decentralized structure at the level of nations of decision-making
processes related to polluting emissions will aggravate the decline in the efficiency of carbon sinks.
A two-player differential game model of pollution is proposed. It accounts for a time-dependent
environmental absorption efficiency and allows for the possibility of a switching of the biosphere
from a carbon sink to a source. The impact of negative externalities from the transboundary
pollution non-cooperative game wherein countries are dynamically involved is investigated. The
differences in steady state between cooperative, open-loop, and Markov perfect Nash equilibria
are studied. For the latter, two numerical methods for its approximation are compared.}
}