%0 Conference Paper
%A Gnecco, Giorgio
%A El Ouardighi, F.
%A Kogan, K.
%A Sanguineti, Marcello
%B 45th Conference of Italian Operational Research Society (AIRO 2015)
%C Pisa, Italy
%D 2015
%F eprints:3130
%P 306-307
%T A Two-Player Differential Game Model for the Management of Transboundary Pollution and  Environmental Absorption
%U http://eprints.imtlucca.it/3130/
%X It is likely that the decentralized structure at the level of nations of decision-making  processes related to polluting emissions will aggravate the decline in the efficiency of carbon sinks.  A two-player differential game model of pollution is proposed. It accounts for a time-dependent  environmental absorption efficiency and allows for the possibility of a switching of the biosphere  from a carbon sink to a source. The impact of negative externalities from the transboundary  pollution non-cooperative game wherein countries are dynamically involved is investigated. The  differences in steady state between cooperative, open-loop, and Markov perfect Nash equilibria  are studied. For the latter, two numerical methods for its approximation are compared.