TY  - CONF
AV  - none
M2  - Pisa, Italy
N2  - It is likely that the decentralized structure at the level of nations of decision-making
processes related to polluting emissions will aggravate the decline in the efficiency of carbon sinks.
A two-player differential game model of pollution is proposed. It accounts for a time-dependent
environmental absorption efficiency and allows for the possibility of a switching of the biosphere
from a carbon sink to a source. The impact of negative externalities from the transboundary
pollution non-cooperative game wherein countries are dynamically involved is investigated. The
differences in steady state between cooperative, open-loop, and Markov perfect Nash equilibria
are studied. For the latter, two numerical methods for its approximation are compared.
ID  - eprints3130
SP  - 306
Y1  - 2015///
EP  - 307
UR  - http://www.airo.org/conferences/airo2015/images/booklet.pdf
A1  - Gnecco, Giorgio
A1  - El Ouardighi, F.
A1  - Kogan, K.
A1  - Sanguineti, Marcello
T2  - 45th Conference of Italian Operational Research Society (AIRO 2015)
TI  - A Two-Player Differential Game Model for the Management of Transboundary Pollution and
Environmental Absorption
ER  -