%X It is likely that the decentralized structure at the level of nations of decision-making
processes related to polluting emissions will aggravate the decline in the efficiency of carbon sinks.
A two-player differential game model of pollution is proposed. It accounts for a time-dependent
environmental absorption efficiency and allows for the possibility of a switching of the biosphere
from a carbon sink to a source. The impact of negative externalities from the transboundary
pollution non-cooperative game wherein countries are dynamically involved is investigated. The
differences in steady state between cooperative, open-loop, and Markov perfect Nash equilibria
are studied. For the latter, two numerical methods for its approximation are compared.
%C Pisa, Italy
%B Book of abstracts of the 45th Conference of Italian Operational Research Society (AIRO)
%A Giorgio Gnecco
%A F. El Ouardighi
%A K. Kogan
%A Marcello Sanguineti
%L eprints3130
%T A Two-Player Differential Game Model for the Management of Transboundary Pollution and
Environmental Absorption
%P 306-307
%D 2015