TY  - CHAP
ID  - eprints342
EP  - 166
T2  - Proc. of the 14th IEEE Symposium Logic In Computer Science (LICS'99)
PB  - IEEE Computer Society
A1  - Boreale, Michele
A1  - De Nicola, Rocco
A1  - Pugliese, Rosario
SP  - 157
N2  - Contextual equivalences for cryptographic process calculi can be used to reason about correctness of protocols, but their definition suffers from quantification over all possible contexts.Here, we focus on two such equivalences, may-testing and barbed equivalence, and investigate tractable proof methods for them. To this aim, we develop an `environment-sensitive' labelled transition system, where transitions are constrained by the knowledge the environment has of names and keys.On top of the new transition system, a trace equivalence and a co-inductive weak bisimulation equivalence are defined, both of which avoid quantification over contexts. Our main results are soundness of trace semantics and of weak bisimulation with respect to may-testing and barbed equivalence, respectively.This leads to more direct proof methods for equivalence checking. The use of such methods is illustrated via a few examples concerning implementation of secure channels by means of encrypted public channels. We also consider a variant of the labelled transition system that gives completeness, but is less handy to use.
KW  - Logical aspects of protocol security
KW  -  Formal methods
KW  -  Concurrency
KW  -  Semantics
Y1  - 1999///
TI  - Proof Techniques for Cryptographic Processes
AV  - none
UR  - http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/LICS.1999.782608
ER  -