relation: http://eprints.imtlucca.it/3584/
title: A Theory of Political Entrenchment
creator: Saint-Paul, Gilles
creator: Ticchi, Davide
creator: Vindigni, Andrea
subject: HB Economic Theory
description: Can an incumbent political party increase its chances at re-election by implementing inefficient policies that harm its constituency? This paper studies the possibility of such a phenomenon, which we label political entrenchment. We use a two-party dynamic model of redistribution with probabilistic voting. Political entrenchment by the Left occurs only if incumbency rents are sufficiently high. Low-skill citizens may vote for this party even though they rationally expect the adoption of these policies. We discuss: the possibility of entrenchment by the Right; the scope for commitment to avoid entrenchment policies; and the effect of state capacity, income inequality and party popularity on the likelihood of entrenchment. We illustrate our theory with a number of historical examples.
publisher: Wiley
date: 2015
type: Article
type: PeerReviewed
identifier:   Saint-Paul, Gilles and Ticchi, Davide and Vindigni, Andrea  A Theory of Political Entrenchment.  The Economic Journal, 126 (593).  pp. 1238-1263.  ISSN 00130133      (2015)  
relation: http://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12215
relation: doi:10.1111/ecoj.12215