%0 Journal Article
%@ 00130133
%A Saint-Paul, Gilles
%A Ticchi, Davide
%A Vindigni, Andrea
%D 2015
%F eprints:3584
%I Wiley
%J The Economic Journal
%N 593
%P 1238-1263
%T A Theory of Political Entrenchment
%U http://eprints.imtlucca.it/3584/
%V 126
%X Can an incumbent political party increase its chances at re-election by implementing inefficient policies that harm its constituency? This paper studies the possibility of such a phenomenon, which we label political entrenchment. We use a two-party dynamic model of redistribution with probabilistic voting. Political entrenchment by the Left occurs only if incumbency rents are sufficiently high. Low-skill citizens may vote for this party even though they rationally expect the adoption of these policies. We discuss: the possibility of entrenchment by the Right; the scope for commitment to avoid entrenchment policies; and the effect of state capacity, income inequality and party popularity on the likelihood of entrenchment. We illustrate our theory with a number of historical examples.