<> "The repository administrator has not yet configured an RDF license."^^ . <> . . . "A Theory of Political Entrenchment"^^ . "Can an incumbent political party increase its chances at re-election by implementing inefficient policies that harm its constituency? This paper studies the possibility of such a phenomenon, which we label political entrenchment. We use a two-party dynamic model of redistribution with probabilistic voting. Political entrenchment by the Left occurs only if incumbency rents are sufficiently high. Low-skill citizens may vote for this party even though they rationally expect the adoption of these policies. We discuss: the possibility of entrenchment by the Right; the scope for commitment to avoid entrenchment policies; and the effect of state capacity, income inequality and party popularity on the likelihood of entrenchment. We illustrate our theory with a number of historical examples."^^ . "2015" . . "126" . "593" . . "Wiley"^^ . . . "The Economic Journal"^^ . . . "00130133" . . . . . . . . . . . . . "Gilles"^^ . "Saint-Paul"^^ . "Gilles Saint-Paul"^^ . . "Andrea"^^ . "Vindigni"^^ . "Andrea Vindigni"^^ . . "Davide"^^ . "Ticchi"^^ . "Davide Ticchi"^^ . . . . . "HTML Summary of #3584 \n\nA Theory of Political Entrenchment\n\n" . "text/html" . . . "HB Economic Theory"@en . .