TY  - JOUR
AV  - public
SN  - 00130133
EP  - 1263
ID  - eprints3584
N2  - Can an incumbent political party increase its chances at re-election by implementing inefficient policies that harm its constituency? This paper studies the possibility of such a phenomenon, which we label political entrenchment. We use a two-party dynamic model of redistribution with probabilistic voting. Political entrenchment by the Left occurs only if incumbency rents are sufficiently high. Low-skill citizens may vote for this party even though they rationally expect the adoption of these policies. We discuss: the possibility of entrenchment by the Right; the scope for commitment to avoid entrenchment policies; and the effect of state capacity, income inequality and party popularity on the likelihood of entrenchment. We illustrate our theory with a number of historical examples.
SP  - 1238
TI  - A Theory of Political Entrenchment
Y1  - 2015///
UR  - http://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12215
A1  - Saint-Paul, Gilles
A1  - Ticchi, Davide
A1  - Vindigni, Andrea
JF  - The Economic Journal
PB  - Wiley
VL  - 126
IS  - 593
ER  -