eprintid: 3584
rev_number: 6
eprint_status: archive
userid: 69
dir: disk0/00/00/35/84
datestamp: 2016-10-10 15:25:11
lastmod: 2016-10-26 10:20:42
status_changed: 2016-10-10 15:25:11
type: article
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Saint-Paul, Gilles
creators_name: Ticchi, Davide
creators_name: Vindigni, Andrea
creators_id: 
creators_id: davide.ticchi@imtlucca.it
creators_id: andrea.vindigni@imtlucca.it
title: A Theory of Political Entrenchment
ispublished: pub
subjects: HB
divisions: EIC
full_text_status: public
abstract: Can an incumbent political party increase its chances at re-election by implementing inefficient policies that harm its constituency? This paper studies the possibility of such a phenomenon, which we label political entrenchment. We use a two-party dynamic model of redistribution with probabilistic voting. Political entrenchment by the Left occurs only if incumbency rents are sufficiently high. Low-skill citizens may vote for this party even though they rationally expect the adoption of these policies. We discuss: the possibility of entrenchment by the Right; the scope for commitment to avoid entrenchment policies; and the effect of state capacity, income inequality and party popularity on the likelihood of entrenchment. We illustrate our theory with a number of historical examples.
date: 2015
date_type: published
publication: The Economic Journal
volume: 126
number: 593
publisher: Wiley
pagerange: 1238-1263
id_number: doi:10.1111/ecoj.12215
refereed: TRUE
issn: 00130133
official_url: http://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12215
citation:   Saint-Paul, Gilles and Ticchi, Davide and Vindigni, Andrea  A Theory of Political Entrenchment.  The Economic Journal, 126 (593).  pp. 1238-1263.  ISSN 00130133      (2015)