@article{eprints3870,
          author = {Ennio Bilancini and Leonardo Boncinelli},
           pages = {141--150},
       publisher = {Elsevier},
          volume = {145},
         journal = {Journal of economic behavior \& organization},
            year = {2018},
           title = {Signaling with costly acquisition of signals},
        abstract = {In this paper we investigate the consequences of introducing a cost to observe the signal in an otherwise standard signaling game. Beyond identifying equilibria, which we contrast with those of a standard signaling game, we study their robustness to two important classes of refinements: acting through restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs and through trembles. Our results suggest that more prominence should be given to the pooling outcome on the minimum signal.},
             url = {http://eprints.imtlucca.it/3870/},
        keywords = {Costly cognition; Costly signal acquisition; Pooling; Equilibrium refinements; Forward induction; Trembles}
}