relation: http://eprints.imtlucca.it/3870/
title: Signaling with costly acquisition of signals
creator: Bilancini, Ennio
creator: Boncinelli, Leonardo
subject: HB Economic Theory
description: In this paper we investigate the consequences of introducing a cost to observe the signal in an otherwise standard signaling game. Beyond identifying equilibria, which we contrast with those of a standard signaling game, we study their robustness to two important classes of refinements: acting through restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs and through trembles. Our results suggest that more prominence should be given to the pooling outcome on the minimum signal.
publisher: Elsevier
date: 2018
type: Article
type: PeerReviewed
identifier:   Bilancini, Ennio and Boncinelli, Leonardo  Signaling with costly acquisition of signals.  Journal of economic behavior & organization, 145.  pp. 141-150.  ISSN 0167-2681      (2018)  
relation: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.10.022
relation: doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.10.022