<> "The repository administrator has not yet configured an RDF license."^^ . <> . . . "Signaling with costly acquisition of signals"^^ . "In this paper we investigate the consequences of introducing a cost to observe the signal in an otherwise standard signaling game. Beyond identifying equilibria, which we contrast with those of a standard signaling game, we study their robustness to two important classes of refinements: acting through restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs and through trembles. Our results suggest that more prominence should be given to the pooling outcome on the minimum signal."^^ . "2018" . . "145" . . "Elsevier"^^ . . . "Journal of economic behavior & organization"^^ . . . "01672681" . . . . . . . . . . "Leonardo"^^ . "Boncinelli"^^ . "Leonardo Boncinelli"^^ . . "Ennio"^^ . "Bilancini"^^ . "Ennio Bilancini"^^ . . . . . "HTML Summary of #3870 \n\nSignaling with costly acquisition of signals\n\n" . "text/html" . . . "HB Economic Theory"@en . .