TY  - JOUR
PB  - Elsevier
SN  - 0167-2681
A1  - Bilancini, Ennio
A1  - Boncinelli, Leonardo
N2  - In this paper we investigate the consequences of introducing a cost to observe the signal in an otherwise standard signaling game. Beyond identifying equilibria, which we contrast with those of a standard signaling game, we study their robustness to two important classes of refinements: acting through restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs and through trembles. Our results suggest that more prominence should be given to the pooling outcome on the minimum signal.
SP  - 141
KW  - Costly cognition; Costly signal acquisition; Pooling; Equilibrium refinements; Forward induction; Trembles
Y1  - 2018///
AV  - none
TI  - Signaling with costly acquisition of signals
JF  - Journal of economic behavior & organization
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.10.022
VL  - 145
ID  - eprints3870
EP  - 150
ER  -