%I Elsevier
%X In this paper we investigate the consequences of introducing a cost to observe the signal in an otherwise standard signaling game. Beyond identifying equilibria, which we contrast with those of a standard signaling game, we study their robustness to two important classes of refinements: acting through restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs and through trembles. Our results suggest that more prominence should be given to the pooling outcome on the minimum signal.
%P 141-150
%T Signaling with costly acquisition of signals
%K Costly cognition; Costly signal acquisition; Pooling; Equilibrium refinements; Forward induction; Trembles
%J Journal of economic behavior & organization
%R doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.10.022
%D 2018
%V 145
%A Ennio Bilancini
%A Leonardo Boncinelli
%L eprints3870