eprintid: 3870
rev_number: 5
eprint_status: archive
userid: 69
dir: disk0/00/00/38/70
datestamp: 2018-01-24 10:21:15
lastmod: 2018-01-24 10:21:15
status_changed: 2018-01-24 10:21:15
type: article
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Bilancini, Ennio
creators_name: Boncinelli, Leonardo
creators_id: ennio.bilancini@imtlucca.it
creators_id: 
title: Signaling with costly acquisition of signals
ispublished: pub
subjects: HB
divisions: EIC
full_text_status: none
keywords: Costly cognition; Costly signal acquisition; Pooling; Equilibrium refinements; Forward induction; Trembles
abstract: In this paper we investigate the consequences of introducing a cost to observe the signal in an otherwise standard signaling game. Beyond identifying equilibria, which we contrast with those of a standard signaling game, we study their robustness to two important classes of refinements: acting through restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs and through trembles. Our results suggest that more prominence should be given to the pooling outcome on the minimum signal.
date: 2018
date_type: published
publication: Journal of economic behavior & organization
volume: 145
publisher: Elsevier
pagerange: 141-150
id_number: doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.10.022
refereed: TRUE
issn: 0167-2681
official_url: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.10.022
citation:   Bilancini, Ennio and Boncinelli, Leonardo  Signaling with costly acquisition of signals.  Journal of economic behavior & organization, 145.  pp. 141-150.  ISSN 0167-2681      (2018)