eprintid: 3872
rev_number: 5
eprint_status: archive
userid: 69
dir: disk0/00/00/38/72
datestamp: 2018-01-24 10:31:32
lastmod: 2018-01-24 10:31:32
status_changed: 2018-01-24 10:31:32
type: article
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Bilancini, Ennio
creators_name: Boncinelli, Leonardo
creators_id: ennio.bilancini@imtlucca.it
creators_id: 
title: Strict Nash Equilibria in Non-Atomic Games with Strict Single Crossing in Players (or Types) and Actions
ispublished: pub
subjects: HB
divisions: EIC
full_text_status: none
abstract: In this paper we study games where the space of player types is atomless and payoff functions satisfy the property of strict single crossing in types and actions. Under an additional assumption of quasisupermodularity in actions of payoff functions and mild assumptions on the type space - partially ordered and with sets of uncomparable types having negligible size - and on the action space - lattice, second countable and satisfying a separation property with respect to the ordering of actions - we prove that every Nash equilibrium is essentially strict. Further, by building on McAdams (2003, Theorem 1), we prove existence of a strict Nash equilibrium and an evolutionarily stable strategy in a general class of incomplete information games satisfying strict single crossing in types and actions.
date: 2016
date_type: published
publication: Economic Theory Bulletin
volume: 4
number: 1
publisher: Springer
pagerange: 95-109
refereed: TRUE
issn: 2196-1085
official_url: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs40505-015-0090-8
citation:   Bilancini, Ennio and Boncinelli, Leonardo  Strict Nash Equilibria in Non-Atomic Games with Strict Single Crossing in Players (or Types) and Actions.  Economic Theory Bulletin, 4 (1).  pp. 95-109.  ISSN 2196-1085      (2016)