eprintid: 50
rev_number: 25
eprint_status: archive
userid: 28
dir: disk0/00/00/00/50
datestamp: 2011-02-10 16:01:08
lastmod: 2014-01-24 14:15:07
status_changed: 2011-02-10 16:01:08
type: monograph
metadata_visibility: show
contact_email: f.sobbrio@imtlucca.it
item_issues_count: 0
creators_name: Blasco, Andrea
creators_name: Pin, Paolo
creators_name: Sobbrio, Francesco
creators_id: 
creators_id: 
creators_id: f.sobbrio@imtlucca.it
title: Paying Positive to Go Negative: Advertisers' Competition and Media Reports
ispublished: unpub
subjects: HB
divisions: EIC
full_text_status: public
monograph_type: working_paper
keywords: Advertising, Media accuracy, Two-sided market, Competition, Commercial Media Bias

note: JEL Classification: L82, D82
abstract: This paper analyzes a two-sided market for news where advertisers may pay a media outlet to conceal negative information about the quality of their own product (paying positive to avoid negative) and/or to disclose negative information about the quality of their competitors' products (paying positive to go negative). We show that whether advertisers have negative consequences on the accuracy of news reports or not ultimately depends on the extent of correlation among advertisers' products. 
Specifically, the lower the correlation among the qualities of the advertisers' products, the (weakly) higher the accuracy of the media outlet' reports. Moreover, when advertisers' products are correlated, a higher degree of competition in the market of the advertisers' products may decrease the accuracy of the media outlet's reports.
date: 2011-07-08
number:  
pages: 29
institution: IMT Institute for Advanced Studies Lucca
citation:   Blasco, Andrea and Pin, Paolo and Sobbrio, Francesco  Paying Positive to Go Negative: Advertisers' Competition and Media Reports.  Working Paper  # /2011        (Unpublished)   
document_url: http://eprints.imtlucca.it/50/1/blasco_pin_sobbrio_2011c.pdf