eprintid: 68
rev_number: 28
eprint_status: archive
userid: 20
dir: disk0/00/00/00/68
datestamp: 2011-02-15 10:28:52
lastmod: 2011-07-11 14:24:17
status_changed: 2011-02-15 10:28:52
type: article
metadata_visibility: show
contact_email: stefano.gattei@imtlucca.it
item_issues_count: 0
creators_name: Gattei, Stefano
creators_id: stefano.gattei@imtlucca.it
title: Karl Popper's Philosophical Breakthrough
ispublished: pub
subjects: B1
divisions: EIC
full_text_status: public
note: Copyright © 2004 Philosophy of Science Association
abstract: Despite his well-known deductivism, in his early (unpublished) writings, Popper held an inductivist position. Up to 1929 epistemology entered Popper's reflections only as far as the problem was that of the justification of the scientific character of these fields of research. However, in that year, while surveying the history of non-Euclidean geometries, Popper explicitly discussed the cognitive status of geometry without referring to psycho-pedagogical aspects, thus turning from cognitive psychology to the logic and methodology of science. As a consequence of his reflections on the problematic relationship between geometrical-mathematical constructions and physical reality Popper was able to get over a too direct notion of such a relationship, cast doubts on inductive inference and started conceiving in a new (strictly non-inductivist) manner the relationship between theoretical and observational propositions.
date: 2004
date_type: published
publication: Philosophy of Science
volume: 71
number: 4
publisher: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association
pagerange: pp. 448-466
id_number: doi: 10.1086/423747
refereed: TRUE
issn: 0031-8248
official_url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/423747
citation:   Gattei, Stefano  Karl Popper's Philosophical Breakthrough.  Philosophy of Science, 71 (4).  pp. 448-466.  ISSN 0031-8248      (2004)  
document_url: http://eprints.imtlucca.it/68/1/gattei2004a.pdf