eprintid: 769
rev_number: 17
eprint_status: archive
userid: 11
dir: disk0/00/00/07/69
datestamp: 2011-08-08 13:04:15
lastmod: 2011-09-27 13:12:23
status_changed: 2011-08-08 13:04:15
type: article
metadata_visibility: show
item_issues_count: 0
creators_name: Acemoglu, Daron
creators_name: Vindigni, Andrea
creators_name: Ticchi, Davide
creators_id: 
creators_id: andrea.vindigni@imtlucca.it
creators_id: davide.ticchi@imtlucca.it
title: Persistence of civil wars
ispublished: pub
subjects: HB
subjects: HN
subjects: JF
divisions: EIC
full_text_status: public
abstract: A notable feature of post-World War II civil wars is their very long average duration. We provide a theory of the persistence of civil wars. The civilian government can successfully defeat rebellious factions only by creating a relatively strong army. In weakly-institutionalized polities this opens the way for excessive influence or coups by the military. Civilian governments whose rents are largely unaffected by civil wars then choose small and weak armies that are incapable of ending insurrections. Our framework also shows that when civilian governments need to take more decisive action against rebels, they may be forced to build over-sized armies, beyond the size necessary for fighting the insurrection, as a commitment to not reforming the military in the future.
date: 2010-05
date_type: published
publication: Journal of the European Economic Association
volume: 8
number: 2-3
publisher: MIT Press
pagerange: 664-676
id_number: 10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.tb00536.x
refereed: TRUE
issn: 1542-4766
official_url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.tb00536.x
citation:   Acemoglu, Daron and Vindigni, Andrea and Ticchi, Davide  Persistence of civil wars.  Journal of the European Economic Association, 8 (2-3).  pp. 664-676.  ISSN 1542-4766      (2010)  
document_url: http://eprints.imtlucca.it/769/1/Ticchi_2010a.pdf