relation: http://eprints.imtlucca.it/770/
title: Endogenous constitutions
creator: Ticchi, Davide
creator: Vindigni, Andrea
subject: HB Economic Theory
subject: JA Political science (General)
description: We present a theory of the choice of alternative democratic constitutions, a majoritarian or a consensual one, in an unequal society. A majoritarian democracy redistributes resources from the collectivity toward relatively few people, and has a relatively small government and low level of taxation. A consensual democracy redistributes resources toward a broader spectrum of social groups but also has a larger government and a higher level of taxation. We show that a consensual system turns out to be preferred by society when ex ante income inequality is relatively low, while a majoritarian system is chosen when income inequality is relatively high. We also obtain that consensual democracies should be expected to be ruled more often by center-left coalitions while the right should have an advantage in majoritarian constitutions. The implications for the relationship between inequality and redistribution are discussed. Historical evidence and a cross-sectional analysis support our results.
publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
date: 2010
type: Article
type: PeerReviewed
format: application/pdf
language: en
identifier: http://eprints.imtlucca.it/770/1/Ticchi_2010b.pdf
identifier:   Ticchi, Davide and Vindigni, Andrea  Endogenous constitutions.  Economic Journal, 120 (543).  pp. 1-39.  ISSN 0013-0133      (2010)  
relation: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02309.x
relation: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02309.x