TY  - JOUR
VL  - 120
ID  - eprints770
EP  - 39
A1  - Ticchi, Davide
A1  - Vindigni, Andrea
SN  - 0013-0133
PB  - Wiley-Blackwell
SP  - 1
N2  - We present a theory of the choice of alternative democratic constitutions, a majoritarian or a consensual one, in an unequal society. A majoritarian democracy redistributes resources from the collectivity toward relatively few people, and has a relatively small government and low level of taxation. A consensual democracy redistributes resources toward a broader spectrum of social groups but also has a larger government and a higher level of taxation. We show that a consensual system turns out to be preferred by society when ex ante income inequality is relatively low, while a majoritarian system is chosen when income inequality is relatively high. We also obtain that consensual democracies should be expected to be ruled more often by center-left coalitions while the right should have an advantage in majoritarian constitutions. The implications for the relationship between inequality and redistribution are discussed. Historical evidence and a cross-sectional analysis support our results.
TI  - Endogenous constitutions
AV  - public
Y1  - 2010///
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02309.x
IS  - 543
JF  - Economic Journal
ER  -