eprintid: 770
rev_number: 12
eprint_status: archive
userid: 11
dir: disk0/00/00/07/70
datestamp: 2011-08-08 13:32:27
lastmod: 2011-09-27 13:12:23
status_changed: 2011-08-08 13:32:27
type: article
metadata_visibility: show
item_issues_count: 0
creators_name: Ticchi, Davide
creators_name: Vindigni, Andrea
creators_id: davide.ticchi@imtlucca.it
creators_id: andrea.vindigni@imtlucca.it
title: Endogenous constitutions
ispublished: pub
subjects: HB
subjects: JA
divisions: EIC
full_text_status: public
abstract: We present a theory of the choice of alternative democratic constitutions, a majoritarian or a consensual one, in an unequal society. A majoritarian democracy redistributes resources from the collectivity toward relatively few people, and has a relatively small government and low level of taxation. A consensual democracy redistributes resources toward a broader spectrum of social groups but also has a larger government and a higher level of taxation. We show that a consensual system turns out to be preferred by society when ex ante income inequality is relatively low, while a majoritarian system is chosen when income inequality is relatively high. We also obtain that consensual democracies should be expected to be ruled more often by center-left coalitions while the right should have an advantage in majoritarian constitutions. The implications for the relationship between inequality and redistribution are discussed. Historical evidence and a cross-sectional analysis support our results.
date: 2010
date_type: published
publication: Economic Journal
volume: 120
number: 543
publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
pagerange: 1-39
id_number: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02309.x
refereed: TRUE
issn: 0013-0133
official_url: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02309.x
citation:   Ticchi, Davide and Vindigni, Andrea  Endogenous constitutions.  Economic Journal, 120 (543).  pp. 1-39.  ISSN 0013-0133      (2010)  
document_url: http://eprints.imtlucca.it/770/1/Ticchi_2010b.pdf