eprintid: 771
rev_number: 17
eprint_status: archive
userid: 11
dir: disk0/00/00/07/71
datestamp: 2011-08-08 13:55:08
lastmod: 2011-09-27 13:12:23
status_changed: 2011-08-08 13:55:08
type: article
metadata_visibility: show
item_issues_count: 0
creators_name: Acemoglu, Daron
creators_name: Ticchi, Davide
creators_name: Vindigni, Andrea
creators_id: 
creators_id: davide.ticchi@imtlucca.it
creators_id: andrea.vindigni@imtlucca.it
title: A theory of military dictatorships
ispublished: pub
subjects: HB
subjects: JA
divisions: EIC
full_text_status: public
abstract: We investigate how nondemocratic regimes use the military and how this can lead to the emergence of military dictatorships. The elite may build a strong military and make the concessions necessary for the military to behave as their perfect agent, or they may risk the military turning against them. Once the transition to democracy takes place, a strong military poses a threat against the nascent democratic regime until it is reformed. We study the role of income inequality and natural resources in the emergence of military dictatorships and show how the national defense role of the military may facilitate democratic consolidation
date: 2010-01
date_type: published
publication: American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics
volume: 2
number: 1
publisher: American Economic Association
pagerange: 1-42
id_number: 10.1257/mac.2.1.1
refereed: TRUE
issn: 1945-7707
official_url: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mac.2.1.1
citation:   Acemoglu, Daron and Ticchi, Davide and Vindigni, Andrea  A theory of military dictatorships.  American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2 (1).  pp. 1-42.  ISSN 1945-7707      (2010)  
document_url: http://eprints.imtlucca.it/771/1/Ticchi_2010c.pdf