eprintid: 775
rev_number: 10
eprint_status: archive
userid: 34
dir: disk0/00/00/07/75
datestamp: 2011-08-09 09:00:52
lastmod: 2011-08-12 15:18:50
status_changed: 2011-08-09 09:00:52
type: article
metadata_visibility: show
item_issues_count: 0
creators_name: Marcucci, Edoardo
creators_name: Marini, Marco A.
creators_name: Ticchi, Davide
creators_id: 
creators_id: 
creators_id: davide.ticchi@imtlucca.it
title: Road pricing as a citizen-candidate game
ispublished: pub
subjects: HB
subjects: HE
divisions: EIC
full_text_status: public
abstract: We construct a political economy model to analyze the political acceptability of road pricing policies.
We use a citizen-candidate framework with a population composed by three groups differing for their income level. We show that road pricing policies are never applied when there is no redistribution of the resources in favour of other modes of transport or when the congestion of these types of transport is relatively high. The results suggest that the efficiency of the redistribution of resources from road to the alternative types of transport as well as the fraction of the population that uses the road transport are key factors in explaining the adoption of road pricing schemes.
date: 2005
date_type: published
publication: European Transport \ Trasporti Europei
volume: 31
publisher: ISTIEE
pagerange: 28-45
refereed: TRUE
issn: 1825-3997
official_url: http://www.istiee.org/te/
citation:   Marcucci, Edoardo and Marini, Marco A. and Ticchi, Davide  Road pricing as a citizen-candidate game.  European Transport \ Trasporti Europei, 31.  pp. 28-45.  ISSN 1825-3997      (2005)  
document_url: http://eprints.imtlucca.it/775/1/Ticchi_2005b.pdf