<> "The repository administrator has not yet configured an RDF license."^^ . <> . . . "A Simple Theory of Defensive Patenting"^^ . "This paper examines innovating firms’ incentives to engage in defensive patenting.\r\nIt first establishes a “truce equilibrium” in patent enforcement: when litigation is\r\ncostly, the equal strength of two symmetric parties’ patent portfolios deters any patent\r\ndisputes along the equilibrium path. This equilibrium behavior generates two benefits\r\nof defensive patenting, namely, to prevent licensing outlays and to protect downstream\r\ninvestments. In addition, firms can use patents to coordinate non-contractible\r\ninvestment decisions. Depending on the joint interests, they can either reach a license\r\nin order to guarantee high investment incentives, or agree not to grant a license so\r\nthat investments are deterred by the litigation threat. On the other hand, the strategic\r\npatenting concern may generate a bandwagon of patent accumulation, where firms\r\nrush to the patent office to get a patent, but the subsequent investment performance\r\nis the same as when there is no patent at all.\r\nThe paper also argues that defensive patenting may weaken the effectiveness of\r\npatents as an appropriation scheme. This offers an explanation that the “pro-patent” policy shift in the United States since the 1980s may actually have undermined the\r\nincentive power of the patent system.\r\n"^^ . "2006-09" . . . . . . . "Jing-Yuan"^^ . "Chiou"^^ . "Jing-Yuan Chiou"^^ . . . . . . "A Simple Theory of Defensive Patenting (PDF)"^^ . . . . . . . . . . . "Chiou_2006a.pdf"^^ . . . "A Simple Theory of Defensive Patenting (Image (JPEG))"^^ . . . . . . "preview.jpg"^^ . . . "A Simple Theory of Defensive Patenting (Indexer Terms)"^^ . . . . . . "indexcodes.txt"^^ . . "HTML Summary of #95 \n\nA Simple Theory of Defensive Patenting\n\n" . "text/html" . . . "HB Economic Theory"@en . . . "K Law (General)"@en . . . "T201 Patents. Trademarks"@en . .