@unpublished{eprints97,
            type = {Working Paper},
           month = {July},
            note = {JEL codes: O3, L1, L4, K4},
          author = {Jing-Yuan Chiou and Richard Schmidtke},
           title = {Revisiting Antitrust Limits to Probabilistic Patent
Disputes: Strategic Entry and Asymmetric
Information},
            year = {2010},
        keywords = {Probabilistic Patents, Antitrust Limits, Patent Settlements},
        abstract = {We consider separately strategic entry and asymmetric information in the design
of the settlement policy governing patent disputes, with a focus on Shapiro (2003)?s
consumer protection rule. We show that, when a potential entrant strategically incurs
an entry cost before engaging in a patent dispute, a more stringent settlement policy
of deterring costly entry is preferable to the patent-holder and may lead to higher
static efficiency. Concerning asymmetric information, when the disputants, but not
the court, learn the patent validity, we derive an ?expectation test,? which requires
that a laxer settlement policy be coupled with higher expected patent validity under
settlement.},
             url = {http://eprints.imtlucca.it/97/}
}